William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 2

Article 3

2012

Doctoring the Law of Nonprofit Associations with
a Band-aid or a Body Cast: A Look at the 1996 and
2008 Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit
Association Acts
Elizabeth S. Miller

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Miller, Elizabeth S. (2012) "Doctoring the Law of Nonprofit Associations with a Band-aid or a Body Cast: A Look at the 1996 and
2008 Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Acts," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 38: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Miller: Doctoring the Law of Nonprofit Associations with a Band-aid or a

DOCTORING THE LAW OF NONPROFIT
ASSOCIATIONS WITH A BAND-AID OR A BODY CAST: A
LOOK AT THE 1996 AND 2008 UNIFORM
UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASSOCIATION ACTS
Elizabeth S. Miller †
I. INTRODUCTION...................................................................... 853
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NONPROFIT ASSOCIATIONS .. 855
III. OVERVIEW OF UNIFORM UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT
ASSOCIATION ACT (1996)...................................................... 858
A. Definition of Nonprofit Association .................................... 859
B. Capacity of Nonprofit Association to Hold Property ............. 862
C. Capacity of Nonprofit Association to Sue and Be Sued......... 863
D. Liability in Tort and Contract ........................................... 865
IV. OVERVIEW OF REVISED UNIFORM UNINCORPORATED
NONPROFIT ASSOCIATION ACT (2008) .................................. 866
A. Definition of Unincorporated Nonprofit Association ............ 867
B. Capacity of Unincorporated Nonprofit Association to Hold
Property ............................................................................ 870
C. Capacity of Unincorporated Nonprofit Association to Sue
and Be Sued ..................................................................... 871
D. Liability in Contract, Tort, or Otherwise ............................. 871
E. Power and Authority to Bind Unincorporated Nonprofit
Association ....................................................................... 873
F. Internal Governance of Unincorporated Nonprofit
Associations ...................................................................... 876
1. Key Terms in Understanding RUUNAA Governance
Rules: “Member,” “Manager,” “Governing Principles,”
and “Established Practices” .......................................... 877
2. Allocation of Governance Powers Between Members
and Managers ............................................................. 880
3. Mechanics of Member and Manager Action: Meetings,
Voting, Notice, etc. ....................................................... 882
4. Membership Matters..................................................... 884
†

Professor of Law, Baylor University School of Law, Waco, Texas.

852

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3

2012] DOCTORING THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ASSOCIATIONS

853

5. Duties of Members and Managers; Exculpation;
Indemnification ........................................................... 885
6. Information Rights ...................................................... 891
7. Distributions and Other Payments ................................ 892
G. Dissolution, Winding Up, and Termination ....................... 893
H. Merger .............................................................................. 894
IV. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 896
I.

INTRODUCTION

Unincorporated nonprofit associations are enigmatic creatures
1
that have long been problematic for the law. In most states,
2
nonprofit associations are governed by “a hodgepodge of common
3
law principles and statutes governing some of their legal aspects.”
In 1992, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated the Uniform Unincorporated
4
This Act was amended in minor
Nonprofit Association Act.
respects in 1996 and continued to be designated the Uniform
5
The Uniform
Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act.
Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (UUNAA) addresses a
very limited number of issues. UUNAA has been adopted in
6
thirteen jurisdictions. In 2005, NCCUSL determined that UUNAA
1. Cox v. Thee Evergreen Church, 836 S.W.2d 167, 169 n.3 (Tex. 1992)
(“Unincorporated associations long have been a problem for the law. They are
analogous to partnerships, and yet not partnerships; analogous to corporations,
and yet not corporations; analogous to joint tenancies, and yet not joint tenancies;
analogous to mutual agencies, and yet not mutual agencies.”).
2. In Parts I and II of this article, the terms “unincorporated nonprofit
association” and “nonprofit association” are used in a generic sense to refer to a
nonprofit organization that is not incorporated and is not a charitable trust or
limited liability company. See infra Parts I, II. “Nonprofit association” and
“unincorporated nonprofit association” are defined terms used in the Uniform
Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act and Revised Uniform Unincorporated
Nonprofit Association Act, respectively. When those terms are used in this article
in the context of the application of those statutes, they are used as defined in the
applicable statute. See infra Parts I, II.
3. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT Prefatory Note, 6B
U.L.A. 142 (Supp. 2011).
4. See UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT, 6A U.L.A. 509–38
(1995) (current version at 6B U.L.A.709–51 (2008)).
5. See UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT (amended 1996), 6B
U.L.A. 709–51 (2008). Section 15 of the 1996 version states: “This [Act] may be
cited as the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (1996).” Id. § 15
at 745.
6. UUNAA has been adopted in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware,
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should be updated and made more comprehensive, and the result
was the Revised Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association
7
Act (RUUNAA), which was approved by NCCUSL in 2008.
8
RUUNAA has been adopted in four jurisdictions. The goal of
RUUNAA is to provide a more modern and integrated basic legal
framework governing nonprofit associations than is provided under
9
the common law and statutes of most states. It addresses some
significant issues not addressed by UUNAA, such as internal
governance, dissolution, winding up, and merger. Thus, RUUNAA
provides rules on numerous issues where there is a dearth of
statutory or common law in most jurisdictions. Supplanting the
vagaries of and filling the gaps in the law of nonprofit associations
with specific statutory provisions holds obvious appeal, but it is
worth noting that legislative adoption of a more comprehensive set
of rules such as RUUNAA limits the flexibility of courts to fashion
common-law rules that are tailored to particular types of nonprofit
associations or particular circumstances.
In addition, close
examination of some of the provisions of RUUNAA raises some
questions that suggest states should carefully consider how
legislative pronouncements in this area are articulated, what issues
are suited to legislative pronouncements applicable to nonprofit
associations in general, and what issues are better left to the
judiciary in particular cases or to statutes addressing specific types
of nonprofit associations.

the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, North Carolina, Texas, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has
Been Adopted at 709, 175 (2008 & Supp. 2011). Arkansas and the District of
Columbia subsequently adopted the Revised Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit
Association Act. See infra note 8.
7. See REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT Prefatory Note
at 142. The Revised Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (2008)
(with prefatory note and comments) is also available online. See REVISED UNIF.
UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu
/bll/archives/ulc/hunaa/2008final.pdf.
8. RUUNAA has been adopted in Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Iowa,
and Nevada. Legislative Fact Sheet - Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (2008),
UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.nccusl.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx
?title=Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (2008) (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
9. See REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT Prefatory Note
at 142.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NONPROFIT ASSOCIATIONS
A nonprofit organization may take the form of a nonprofit
10
corporation, charitable trust, or nonprofit association. In some
states, a limited liability company may be formed for a nonprofit
11
State nonprofit corporation statutes provide definite
purpose.
and comprehensive rules regarding the formation and operation of
12
Limited liability company statutes
a nonprofit corporation.
likewise provide a comprehensive set of rules for the formation and
operation of a limited liability company, but the default statutory
provisions generally contemplate owners who have invested in a
for-profit business, and special challenges are thus presented in
drafting the governing documents of a nonprofit limited liability
13
company. Specific statutory provisions regarding charitable trusts
are limited, but private trust law provides many of the rules for
14
charitable trusts. The charitable trust is not a suitable form of
organization for conducting a business or other active operations
but can be an appropriate vehicle for foundations that simply
15
collect, hold, and disperse property for charitable purposes.
Nonprofit organizations that are not formed as a nonprofit
corporation, nonprofit limited liability company, or charitable trust
are nonprofit associations. Nonprofit associations take many
shapes and sizes, and the law that applies to them has traditionally
consisted of a vague combination of statutes and common-law
principles that create a number of problems for nonprofit
associations.
Though there are some large, highly structured nonprofit
16
associations, many nonprofit associations are quite small and
10. 1 MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: LAW AND TAXATION § 1:3
(2011).
11. See 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 4.10 (2011).
12. See 1 PHELAN, supra note 10, § 1:10.
13. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 11, § 4.10.
14. 1 PHELAN, supra note 10, § 1:4.
15. See id.
16. See UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT Prefatory Note
(amended 1996), 6B U.L.A. 711 (2008) (pointing out that NCCUSL is an
unincorporated association and that the Association of American Law Schools and
the American Bar Association were not incorporated until 1972 and 1992,
respectively). NCCUSL (now also known as the Uniform Law Commission)
continues to be organized as an unincorporated nonprofit association. About the
ULC, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.nccusl.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About the
ULC (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (stating that the Uniform Law Commission is “a
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informal. Nonprofit associations include charitable organizations,
churches and other religious organizations, political groups, social
clubs, and trade associations.
Some have detailed written
constitutions; many function quite informally with little in the way
of written governing documents. Because no formal action such as
a filing is required to create a nonprofit association, it is essentially
the default form of nonprofit organization, much like the general
partnership is the default form of business in the for-profit sector.
A somewhat typical definition of an unincorporated association is
“a voluntary group of persons, without a charter, formed by mutual
consent for the purpose of promoting a common enterprise or
17
The affairs of an
prosecuting a common objective.”
unincorporated association are regulated by any written articles,
constitution, or bylaws adopted by its members; in the absence of
such governing documents, “the government of unincorporated
associations will be determined by common parliamentary rules,
their powers may be ascertained by usage acquiesced in by the
members thereof, and they may adopt any lawful means to
18
accomplish their purposes.”
Historically, unincorporated associations, including nonprofit
associations, have not been considered separate legal entities and
19
have had no legal existence apart from their members. The lack
of entity status creates a number of problems for a nonprofit
association and its members. For example, under the common law,
the association itself cannot hold title to property, thus
20
necessitating that title to property be held through trustees.
Additionally, the common law did not recognize an association’s

non-profit unincorporated association”).
17. Cox v. Thee Evergreen Church, 836 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Tex. 1992) (citing
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1531–32 (6th ed. 1990)). Courts generally look for some
degree of organization in order to characterize a group as an unincorporated
association. See, e.g., Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 641, 643 n.2 (Tex. 1996)
(commenting that it was doubtful that a group of anti-abortion protestors, who
met together the night before a demonstration and reconvened the next morning
for the demonstration, could be considered an unincorporated association where
the demonstration was organized by an individual who operated his anti-abortion
activities as a sole proprietorship and the protestors had no newsletter, no charter,
no membership, no formal organization, and no regular meetings).
18. Johnson v. S. Blue Hill Cemetery Ass’n, 221 A.2d 280, 283 (Me. 1966).
19. Cox, 836 S.W.2d at 169.
20. Id.; see also Johnson, 221 A.2d at 284 (noting unincorporated associations
“have no such legal existence as will permit them to acquire and hold property in
the associate name,” but they may acquire and hold property through trustees).
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21

capacity to sue or be sued.
This principle has been altered in
many states by procedural rules or statutes permitting suit in the
name of an unincorporated association, but these procedural
22
Thus,
modifications do not generally alter substantive rights.
even though a judgment may be entered against a nonprofit
association in its name, the aggregate nature of the association for
other purposes still presents difficulties for the members.
Liabilities incurred on behalf of a nonprofit association or in
the course of its activities are a matter of serious concern to the
members as a result of a nonprofit association’s lack of legal
identity under the common law. Although the liability of members
of a nonprofit association at common law is not necessarily
coextensive with partner-type vicarious liability, significant risks
nevertheless loom by virtue of member status. With regard to
contracts, a member incurring a debt on behalf of the association
23
or assenting to its creation is personally liable. Broadly applied,
this rule does not require knowledge of the specific contract and
leads to liability for any debt “necessarily contracted to carry out
24
With regard to tort liabilities,
the objects of the association.”
some courts have adopted a rule of partner-type liability whereby a
member’s status as member is alone sufficient to impose liability for
25
tortious acts or omissions of another acting for the association.
Other courts have concluded that mere membership in the
association is an insufficient basis to impose liability for another
member’s tortious conduct and that liability of a member must be
analyzed based on the specific actions undertaken, authorized, or

21. Cox, 836 S.W.2d at 169.
22. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 28 (permitting suit by or against an
unincorporated association doing business under an assumed name); see also Fast
v. Kahan, 481 P.2d 958, 963 (Kan. 1971) (“Even in those states where statutes have
been enacted permitting unincorporated associations to be sued eo nomine, it has
generally been held not to preclude a plaintiff from pursuing any remedy available
to him at law or in equity against the individual members.”); Cox, 836 S.W.2d at
171 (discussing Rule 28 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure).
23. Cox, 836 S.W.2d at 170.
24. Sec. First Nat’l Bank of L.A. v. Cooper, 145 P.2d 722, 729 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1944).
25. See, e.g., Fast, 481 P.2d at 963 (holding that defendant was severally liable
as a member of the association); see also David J. Oliveiri, Annotation, Liability of
Member of Unincorporated Association for Tortious Acts of Association’s Nonmember Agent
or Employee, 62 A.L.R.3d 1165 (1975) (discussing various courts’ treatment of the
liability of a member of an unincorporated association for the tortious acts of the
association’s nonmember agent or employee).
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26

ratified by the member.
Yet another problem arising from the aggregate nature of the
nonprofit association at common law is the situation in which a
member suffers an injury due to the tortious conduct of another
member or agent of the association.
Historically, an
unincorporated association has not been liable to a member for
damages caused by the wrongful act of another member or agent of
27
the association. The conceptual underpinning of this rule is that
the injured member and the association are co-principals, and the
wrongful conduct is thus imputed to the plaintiff for purposes of
28
In essence, the plaintiff would be suing
the plaintiff’s suit.
29
herself. Courts in a number of jurisdictions have abrogated this
30
doctrine.
III. OVERVIEW OF UNIFORM UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT
ASSOCIATION ACT (1996)
The purpose of UUNAA is to improve upon the common law
31
with respect to a limited number of legal problems. UUNAA is
thus a skeletal statute. It reforms the common law in three
significant areas: (1) the capacity of a nonprofit association to
32
acquire, hold, and transfer property; (2) the capacity of a
33
nonprofit association to sue and be sued as an entity; and (3) the
contract and tort liability of a nonprofit association, its members,
34
and persons who participate in management of the association.
The approach of UUNAA is that a nonprofit association is a legal
26. See, e.g., Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex. 1996) (rejecting the
lower court’s holding that “the existence of such an association might alone form
the basis for imposing tort liability on all members for the acts of some”); see also
Oliveiri, supra note 25 (discussing various courts’ treatment of the liability of a
member of an unincorporated association for the tortious acts of the association’s
nonmember agent or employee).
27. Cox, 836 S.W.2d at 170.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 172–73 (citing White v. Cox, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259, 261 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971); Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 513 (Del. 1991); Buteas v. Raritan
Lodge, 591 A.2d 623, 628 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Tanner v. Columbus
Lodge No. 11, 337 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ohio 1975); Crocker v. Barr, 409 S.E.2d 368,
372 (S.C. 1991)).
31. See UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT Prefatory Note
(amended 1996), 6B U.L.A. 710–11 (2008).
32. See id. § 4 at 720.
33. See id. § 7 at 732.
34. See id. § 6 at 728.
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entity for the purposes of these three areas; UUNAA does not make
35
nonprofit associations legal entities for all purposes.
The provisions of UUNAA revolve around the three basic areas
36
UUNAA does not address questions of
mentioned above.
membership, governance, or other issues addressed in modern
37
nonprofit corporation statutes. Efforts to develop default internal
governance rules demonstrated the complexity and difficulty of
devising rules that reasonably would fit the wide variety of
38
nonprofit associations encompassed by UUNAA, and the drafters
thus concluded that the area was best left to a jurisdiction’s
39
common law or other statutes on the subject.
A. Definition of Nonprofit Association
UUNAA defines a “nonprofit association” as “an
unincorporated organization, other than one created by a trust,
consisting of [two] or more members joined by mutual consent for
40
The statute does not define
a common, nonprofit purpose.”
“nonprofit purpose.” The definition does not require that the
nonprofit association be tax-exempt for federal or state tax
purposes, but an unincorporated association organized for a taxexempt purpose would certainly fall within the scope of the term

35. Id. Prefatory Note at 712. Though UUNAA does not explicitly provide
that a nonprofit association is an entity for any purpose other than the issues
addressed in UUNAA, a court might conclude by analogy that entity treatment
makes sense in contexts not specifically addressed by the statute.
36. Sections 4, 5, 9, and 19 of UUNAA relate to holding, acquiring, and
disposing of property. Sections 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13 relate to suits by and
against a nonprofit association. Sections 6 and 8 relate to liability of a member or
person authorized to participate in management of a nonprofit association. See
generally id. §§ 4–13, 19 at 709–51.
37. Id. Prefatory Note at 712.
38. UUNAA applies to all types of nonprofit associations, i.e., public benefit,
mutual benefit, and religious associations. Id. Thus, UUNAA applies to
“unincorporated philanthropic, educational, scientific, and literary clubs, unions,
trade associations, political organizations, cooperatives, churches, hospitals,
condominium associations, neighborhood associations, and all other
unincorporated types of nonprofit associations.” Id. UUNAA was drafted with
“small informal associations in mind,” although there are notable instances of
large nonprofit organizations operating as unincorporated associations. Id.
39. Id. § 2 cmt. 3 at 719.
40. Id. § 1(2) at 715–16. The definition goes on to state that “joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, or tenancy by the entireties does not by itself establish a
nonprofit association, even if the co-owners share use of the property for a
nonprofit purpose.” Id. at 716.
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41

“nonprofit association.”
The comments to UUNAA state that
“nonprofit” is used in a broad sense and goes beyond the
commonly used definition of the term as an association whose net
gains do not inure to the benefit of its members and which makes
42
Thus, a
no distribution before dissolution to its members.
consumer cooperative that is not organized under a specific state
or federal statute would be a nonprofit association under UUNAA
43
even though it makes distributions to its members. A Colorado
court determined that UUNAA applied to a political candidate’s
44
campaign committee. A Texas court opined that the pooling of
money by investors for their common defense in tax litigation with
the Internal Revenue Service appeared to fall within the definition
45
of a nonprofit association under UUNAA.
For an association to fall within the definition of a nonprofit
46
association under UUNAA, it must have at least two members. A
“member” is defined as “a person who, under the rules or practices
of a nonprofit association, may participate in the selection of
persons authorized to manage the affairs of the nonprofit
association or in the development of policy of the nonprofit
47
association.” UUNAA is concerned only with whether a person is
a “member” for purposes of external relations, such as liabilities to
48
third parties. The comments to UUNAA point out that a person
is not a member for purposes of the statute simply because the
49
association calls a person a member. For example, a supporter or
donor who is not authorized to participate in the development of
policy or in the selection of persons who manage the affairs of the

41. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (West 2011).
42. UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 1 cmt. 9 at 718.
43. Id.
44. Mohr v. Kelly, 8 P.3d 543, 545–46 (Colo. App. 2000).
45. Izen v. Sjostrom, No. 14-06-00142-CV, 2007 WL 968841, at *3 (Tex. App.
Apr. 3, 2007).
46. UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 1(2) at 715–16. UUNAA
recommends to the states that the definition require two or more members, but
the number is enclosed in brackets to suggest that the states consider whether the
number should be one or two or an even larger number. Id. § 1 cmt. 8 at 717.
Some states have required a larger number. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §
252.001(2) (West 2010) (specifying a minimum of three members).
47. UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 1(1) at 715. The statute
defines “person” to include artificial persons, such as corporations and
partnerships, as well as individuals. Id. § 1(3) at 716.
48. Id. § 1 cmt. 1 at 716.
49. Id. § 1 cmt. 2.
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nonprofit association is not a “member” as defined by UUNAA.
On the other hand, the definition of a “member” is broad enough
that the association need not designate or refer to members in
order to have members within the meaning of the statute. Some
nonprofit organizations have self-perpetuating boards and may not
refer at all to “members” in their organizational structures. It
appears that persons serving on the governing board would
51
constitute “members” in such cases.
The definition of a nonprofit association is sufficiently broad
to encompass formal and informal associations. No filing or
writing is required to create a nonprofit association, and much as a
general partnership may arise inadvertently, a nonprofit association
may be created without a realization on the part of its members
that such an association has been created. In the case of an
informal or inadvertent partnership, the partnership provisions of
state partnership statutes contain a somewhat comprehensive set of
rules that govern the relationship of the partners in the absence of
52
an agreement. UUNAA leaves the rules that govern the operation
of a nonprofit association’s affairs and the rights and duties of the
members inter se and with respect to the association to the
governing documents or agreements adopted by the members or
53
the common law. The answers to legal issues that may arise in the
unincorporated association context often are not clear, and
54
UUNAA has been criticized for its skeletal approach.
50. Id.
51. This is so because the persons on a self-perpetuating board select the
persons authorized to manage the affairs of the nonprofit association, and the
definition includes as a “member” a person entitled to participate in the selection
of persons authorized to manage the affairs of the association. Indeed, if an
association has a governing board that determines organizational policies, as is
typically the case in a board structure, a board member would fall within the
definition of a “member” of the association regardless of whether the board selects
the persons authorized to manage the association’s affairs because the definition
includes as a “member” a person who may participate in the development of policy
of the association. See id. § 1(2) at 715–16.
52. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (amended 1997), 6 Pt. I U.L.A. 1-274 (2001).
53. UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2 at 719 (“Principles of law
and equity supplement this [Act] unless displaced by a particular provision of it.”).
See also id. § 18(c) at 746 (“This [Act] replaces existing law with respect to matters
covered by this [Act] but does not affect other law respecting nonprofit
associations.”).
54. See Memorandum 2000-44, Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act,
CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N (July 7, 2000), http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/2000
/MM00-44.pdf. The California Law Revision Commission was charged with
determining whether UUNAA should be adopted in California in whole or in part.
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B. Capacity of Nonprofit Association to Hold Property
Under UUNAA, “[a] nonprofit association is a legal entity
separate from its members for the purposes of acquiring, holding,
55
encumbering, and transferring real and personal property.”
A
nonprofit association under UUNAA may acquire, hold, encumber,
or transfer property in its name and may be a beneficiary of a trust,
56
Thus, UUNAA resolves a major problem for
contract, or will.
57
nonprofit associations under the common law.
UUNAA provides for an optional filing of a statement of
58
authority as to real property. If a nonprofit association desires, it
may execute and record a statement of authority to transfer an
estate or interest in real property in the name of the nonprofit
association, and the authority of a person named in a recorded
statement of authority is conclusive in favor of a person who gives
59
value without notice that the person lacks authority.
UUNAA contains a provision for the disposition of personal
60
property of a nonprofit association that has become inactive.
There are numerous questions that may arise under this provision,
61
such as the meaning of “inactive” and the duties of the transferee
of property. The provision only applies to personal property and is
intended to relieve a person in possession of the property of
62
responsibility for the property. The provision authorizes a person
in possession or control of personal property of a nonprofit
association to transfer custody of the property if the nonprofit
63
A
association has been inactive for three years or longer.
The Commission ultimately recommended improvement and reorganization of
existing unincorporated association statutes in California rather than adoption of
UUNAA. Extensive materials relating to the Commission’s study can be found at
http://www.clrc.ca.gov/B501.html#Staff Memoranda.
55. UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 4(a) at 720.
56. Id. § 4(b)–(c).
57. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
58. UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 5 at 722–23.
59. Id.
60. Id. § 9 at 735.
61. The statute does not define “inactive.” Id. § 9 cmt. 2. The comments to
UUNAA provide the following examples of an inactive association: (1) “[a]
nonprofit association that has accomplished its purpose, such as seeking approval
in a school bond election”; and (2) “[a] nonprofit association that has stopped
pursuing its purposes, collecting dues, holding elections of officers and board
members, and conducting meetings, and [that] has no employees.” Id.
62. Id. § 9 cmt. 1 (pointing out that the provision is not a dissolution
provision).
63. Id. § 9.
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document of a nonprofit association may specify a longer or
64
shorter period of inactivity. The property may be transferred to a
person specified in a document of a nonprofit association or, if no
person is specified, “to a nonprofit association or nonprofit
corporation pursuing broadly similar purposes, or to a government
65
or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality.”
UUNAA offers two alternative provisions facilitating the
effectuation of a purported transfer of property to a nonprofit
66
association before the effective date of UUNAA. One provision
would be appropriate for adoption in a state having the initial
common-law rule that a purported transfer of property to a
nonprofit association totally failed, and the other provision would
be appropriate in a state that had adopted the rule that an estate or
interest in property purportedly transferred to a nonprofit
67
association vested in a fiduciary. Depending upon what rules a
state has adopted with respect to transfers of property to nonprofit
associations, adoption of one, both, or neither alternative may be
68
appropriate.
C. Capacity of Nonprofit Association to Sue and Be Sued
UUNAA broadly recognizes the right of a nonprofit
association to participate as an entity in judicial, administrative, or
69
governmental proceedings and in arbitration or mediation. The
comments to UUNAA note that many states have enacted
provisions granting unincorporated associations the right to sue
and be sued but have rejected the argument that these provisions
70
make the association a separate entity for other purposes.
UUNAA specifies that a nonprofit association is an entity for
purposes of enforcing rights, duties, and liabilities in contract and
71
tort, but the failure to provide entity status for all purposes leaves
in question the extent to which a nonprofit association under
UUNAA enjoys rights or may be bound by obligations that do not
arise under contract or tort law, i.e., rights or obligations
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 19 at 747.
See id. § 19 cmt. 1 at 748.
See id.
Id. §§ 6(a), 7(a) at 732.
Id. § 7 cmt. 1.
Id. § 6(a) at 728.
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emanating from a constitution, statute, or regulation.
Consistent with its entity approach to proceedings against a
nonprofit association, UUNAA provides that a claim against a
nonprofit association does not abate merely because of a change in
73
its members or managing persons, and a judgment against a
nonprofit association is not by itself a judgment against a member
74
or managing person. UUNAA rejects the common-law notion of
an association and its members as co-principals by providing that a
member of a nonprofit association may assert a claim against the
75
nonprofit association and vice versa. UUNAA permits, but does
not require, a nonprofit association to file an appointment of agent
76
to receive service of process.
UUNAA describes a nonprofit association’s standing to
77
represent the interests of its members in a proceeding. Under
this provision, “a nonprofit association may assert a claim in its
name on behalf of its members if: [1] one or more members of the
nonprofit association have standing to assert a claim in their own
right, [2] the interests the nonprofit association seeks to protect
are germane to its purposes, and [3] neither the claim asserted nor
78
the relief requested requires the participation of a member.” The
comments note that this is the federal rule of standing and that a
nonprofit association must meet the three requirements of this
provision only if it seeks to represent the interests of its members; if
the suit concerns only the nonprofit association’s interests, these
79
requirements do not apply.

72. See, e.g., Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding
that an unincorporated anti-abortion association is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and thus could not sue a city under § 1983 for violating the association’s
First Amendment rights when the city denied the association a parade permit).
UUNAA did not enter into the court’s analysis, and it is not clear that entity status
conferred by a state statute for some or all purposes would have altered the result,
but the court recognized that corporations, nonprofit corporations, and unions
are “persons” for purposes of § 1983 and distinguished unions from
unincorporated associations on the basis of the similarity between unions and
corporations. Id. at 1213–15.
73. UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 11 at 742.
74. Id. § 8 at 733.
75. See id. § 6(e) at 728.
76. Id. § 10 at 738.
77. Id. § 7(b) at 732.
78. Id.
79. Id. § 7 cmt. 3.
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D. Liability in Tort and Contract
UUNAA provides that a nonprofit association is a “legal entity
separate from its members for the purposes of determining and
80
enforcing rights, duties, and liabilities in contract and tort.” This
statement clearly establishes that a nonprofit association may be
bound as an entity on contracts entered into on its behalf and held
81
liable for tortious acts imputable to it as an entity. The statute
goes on to expressly provide that a person is not liable for the
breach of contract or tortious act or omission of a nonprofit
association merely because the person is a member, a person
authorized to participate in management of the nonprofit
association, or a person considered to be a member by the
82
It might be argued that these provisions do not
association.
literally alter the common-law liability of members or managing
persons in jurisdictions in which a person’s contractual liability is
based on the person’s authorization of or assent to the contract
and a person’s liability in tort hinges on the person’s participation
83
The comments make
or ratification of the tortious conduct.
clear, however, that the intent of the provisions is to preserve only
the type of direct liability that a person has under other law, such as
liability on a contract that the person has personally guaranteed or
80. Id. § 6(a) at 728. Consistent with this principle, a judgment or order
against a nonprofit association is not by itself a judgment or order against a
member or a person considered to be a member by the nonprofit association. Id.
§ 8 at 733.
81. The articulation of the principles set out in section 6 of UUNAA in terms
of “contract” and “tort” may literally describe the intended scope in terms that are
too narrow. See id. § 6 at 728. Presumably, the drafters intended an association to
have the benefits conferred and obligations imposed by statutory and regulatory
schemes such as employment laws as well as to shelter members and managing
members from liabilities arising from such laws.
82. Id. § 6(b)–(c). Phrasing the liability protection in terms of “contract” and
“tort” raises the question of whether other types of liabilities, such as liabilities
under statutory and regulatory provisions, are encompassed. The commentary
reflects the assumption that the liability protection is similar to corporate liability
protection (alluding to the possibility of application of corporate veil-piercing
principles) and gives no indication that the “contract” and “tort” characterization
was intended to leave members exposed to vicarious liability for other types of
liabilities that might not literally fall within the scope of common-law contract and
tort liabilities. See id. § 6 cmt. 6 at 729.
83. See Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex. 1996); Cox v. Thee
Evergreen Church, 836 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. 1992); see also Oliveiri, supra note
25 (collecting cases that discuss the liability of a member of an unincorporated
association for the tortious acts of the association’s nonmember agent or
employee).
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entered into on behalf of an undisclosed or partially disclosed
principal, or liability for a tort with respect to which the person is
84
actually a tortfeasor. The case law interpreting these provisions to
date, albeit sparse, reflects the understanding that UUNAA
85
provides corporate-type liability protection. The comments point
out that courts have applied veil-piercing principles to nonprofit
corporations and suggest that the entity status of a nonprofit
association under UUNAA might also be disregarded under similar
86
principles.
IV. OVERVIEW OF REVISED UNIFORM UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT
ASSOCIATION ACT (2008)
Like UUNAA, RUUNAA is intended to improve upon the
common law with respect to a limited number of legal problems,
but RUUNAA reflects NCCUSL’s decision that an updated and
87
In contrast to the
more comprehensive statute was needed.
approach of UUNAA, which only addresses the status of a
nonprofit association as an entity in the context of the specific
88
areas addressed in UUNAA, RUUNNA states that a nonprofit
association is a legal entity separate and distinct from its members
and managers as a general principle rather than tying entity

30.

84.

UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 6 cmts. 2–10, 15 at 729–

85. See Mohr v. Kelly, 8 P.3d 543, 546 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding that a
candidate was not liable for obligations of his campaign committee, a nonprofit
association, to pay the committee’s former employees, even if the candidate was a
member of the committee, had management responsibilities within the
committee, or negotiated the employment contracts on behalf of the committee);
Izen v. Sjostrom, No. 14-06-00142-CV, 2007 WL 968841, at *5 (Tex. App. Apr. 3,
2007) (rejecting attorney’s argument that a member of a legal defense fund,
which the court stated appeared to fit the definition of a nonprofit association
under UUNAA, had personal liability for attorney’s fees owed by the fund to the
attorney because UUNAA provides that a person is not liable for a nonprofit
association’s contract merely because the person is a member or authorized to
participate in management of the association’s affairs).
86. UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 6 cmt. 6 at 729.
87. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT Prefatory Note, 6B
U.L.A. 142 (Supp. 2011).
88. UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT Prefatory Note at 712.
Though UUNAA does not explicitly provide that a nonprofit association is an
entity for any purpose other than the issues addressed in UUNAA, a court might
well be persuaded that entity treatment makes sense in contexts not specifically
addressed by the statute, and a court should not be precluded by UUNAA from
concluding that a nonprofit association is an entity for other purposes.
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89

treatment to particular areas.
RUUNAA refines and expands
upon the three basic areas addressed by UUNAA (i.e., capacity of a
nonprofit association to acquire, hold, and transfer property;
capacity of a nonprofit association to sue and be sued as an entity;
and contract and tort liability of a nonprofit association, its
members, and persons who participate in management of the
association) and addresses numerous other issues, such as internal
governance (including quorum and voting rules, duties of
members and managers, information rights, and limitations on
90
distributions), dissolution and winding up, and merger. Though
it significantly expands the skeletal coverage of UUNAA, RUUNAA
is not nearly as comprehensive as the typical state nonprofit
corporation statute and is not intended to provide a substitute for
91
organizing a nonprofit organization as a nonprofit corporation.
A. Definition of Unincorporated Nonprofit Association
RUUNAA defines an “unincorporated nonprofit association”
as “an unincorporated organization consisting of [two] or more
members joined under an agreement that is oral, in a record, or
implied from conduct, for one or more common, nonprofit
92
This definition is similar to the definition of a
purposes.”
“nonprofit association” under UUNAA, with the concept of
“mutual consent” in UUNAA articulated in RUUNAA as “an
93
agreement that is oral, in a record, or implied from conduct.”
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 5(a) at 149.
See generally id. §§ 1–36 at 140–74.
Id. Prefatory Note at 142.
Id. § 2(8) at 145.
See UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 1(2) at 715–16;
REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2(8) at 145. The creation
of a nonprofit association governed by either of these statutes hinges on mutual
consent or agreement, but it is certainly possible for persons to associate together
for a nonprofit purpose in a manner that creates such an association without any
particular understanding of the type of organization they have created or the
statute that governs it, just as persons may associate together to engage in a
business for profit in a manner that constitutes a general partnership without the
realization that they have created a partnership. See UNIF. P’SHP ACT § 202(a)
(amended 1997), 6 Pt. I U.L.A. 92 (2001). Indeed, UUNAA and RUUNAA were
drafted with small informal associations (of the type that are likely to have failed to
consider legal and organizational questions) in mind. UNIF. UNINCORPORATED
NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT Prefatory Note at 711; REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED
NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT Prefatory Note at 142. However, persons may expressly
agree that they have not formed an unincorporated nonprofit association
governed by RUUNAA even though their association would otherwise fall within
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RUUNAA, like UUNAA, excludes a trust and various types of coownership of property from the definition, but RUUNAA specifies
the following additional exclusions: a marriage and various other
types of domestic relationships, an organization formed under
another statute that governs the organization or operation of
unincorporated associations, and a relationship under an
agreement that expressly provides that the relationship does not
94
create an unincorporated nonprofit association. Like UUNAA,
RUUNAA does not define “nonprofit purpose” and does not
require that the nonprofit association be tax-exempt for federal or
95
The comments to RUUNAA state that the
state tax purposes.
nonprofit corporation act of an enacting jurisdiction is probably
the best reference point for what constitutes a nonprofit purpose
and that each enacting jurisdiction should determine whether
96
these limitations should be expressly set forth in the statute.
As is the case for a nonprofit association under UUNAA, an
unincorporated nonprofit association under RUUNAA must have
97
at least two members. The comments to RUUNAA distinguish

the definition of an unincorporated nonprofit association under RUUNAA,
whereas the subjective intent or label chosen by the parties will not preclude
characterization of their arrangement as a general partnership if it otherwise falls
within the definition of a partnership. Compare REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED
NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2(8)(E) at 145 with UNIF. P’SHP ACT § 202 cmt. 1 at 93.
UUNAA is silent on this issue.
94. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2(8) at 145.
95. RUUNAA contains a provision specifying that an unincorporated
nonprofit association may engage in profit-making activities so long as the profits
from such activities are used or set aside for the association’s nonprofit purposes.
Id. § 5(d) at 150.
96. Id. § 2 cmt. 8 at 147. The comments to RUUNAA further note that the
statute applies to all unincorporated nonprofit associations, whether religious,
public benefit, or mutual benefit, and thus “will cover unincorporated
philanthropic, educational, scientific, social and literary clubs, unions, trade
associations, political organizations, . . . churches, hospitals, neighborhood and
property owner associations, and sports organizations . . . .” Id.
97. As in UUNAA, the number two is bracketed to signify that a state might
choose to vary this requirement. Id. § 2(8) at 145; UNIF. UNINCORPORATED
NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 1(2) at 715–16. The comments to UUNAA take a negative
tone toward a definition providing for a minimum of one member but
nevertheless “raise the question” and appear to acknowledge that a state might
choose to so provide. UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 1 cmt. 8 at
717. The comments to RUUNAA take the position that the requirement of two
members is “quite minimal” and is necessary in order to have an agreement; there
is no suggestion that the possibility of a definition allowing for only one member
should be entertained. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2
cmt. 8 at 147.
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RUUNAA from state nonprofit corporation statutes, in that
nonprofit corporation statutes typically permit a nonprofit
corporation to have a self-perpetuating board and no members,
while RUUNAA requires that an unincorporated nonprofit
98
association have a minimum of two members. This distinction
may be less significant than the comments suggest, however. The
definition of a member for purposes of RUUNAA would include
the persons functioning as “directors” of an unincorporated
nonprofit association since a member is “a person that may
participate in the selection of persons authorized to manage the
affairs” of the association or in the “development of the policies
99
and activities of the association.” Thus, a nonprofit association
with a self-perpetuating board consisting of at least two persons
would satisfy the minimum two-member requirement even though
the association may have no participants referred to as “members”
by the association itself.
Whereas UUNAA provides for entity treatment of a nonprofit
association for specified purposes, RUUNAA sets forth the general
principle that an unincorporated nonprofit association is a separate
100
RUUNAA also provides a default rule of perpetual
legal entity.
duration for unincorporated nonprofit associations and includes
the standard general powers provision included in uniform
101
unincorporated entity laws.
RUUNAA expands upon UUNAA’s provisions dealing with the
102
relationship of the statute to other laws by expressly providing
that inconsistent provisions of other statutes governing specific
types of unincorporated nonprofit associations prevail over
103
RUUNAA further states that RUUNAA
provisions of RUUNAA.
98. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2 cmt. 8 at 147.
99. Id. § 2(4) at 144. The definition is essentially the same under UUNAA.
UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 1(1) at 715. Both statutes define
“person” to include legal and commercial entities as well as individuals. REVISED
UNIF. UNINCORPORATED ASS’N ACT § 2(5) at 144; UNIF. UNINCORPORATED
NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 1(3) at 716.
100. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 5(a) at 149.
101. Id. § 5(b)–(c), cmt. 3.
102. UUNAA provides that “[p]rinciples of law and equity supplement this
[Act] unless displaced by a particular provision of it.” UNIF. UNINCORPORATED
NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2 at 719. This provision is typically included in NCCUSL
uniform acts, and it is set forth in RUUNAA as well.
REVISED UNIF.
UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 3(a), cmt. 1 at 148.
103. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 3(b) at 148. The
comments to RUUNAA note that many jurisdictions have statutes governing
particular types of unincorporated nonprofit associations, e.g., churches. Id. § 3
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“supplements the law of this state that applies to nonprofit
associations operating in this state” and that “[i]f a conflict exists,
104
The precise application of this provision is
that law applies.”
105
A legislative note suggests that a thorough
somewhat unclear.
review of other laws should be conducted to determine whether
they need to be amended to continue to apply to unincorporated
106
nonprofit associations after RUUNAA becomes effective.
RUUNAA also includes a provision that specifies the law governing
the internal affairs of an unincorporated nonprofit association and
107
the law governing matters other than its internal affairs.
B. Capacity of Unincorporated Nonprofit Association to Hold Property
RUUNAA includes provisions similar to the provisions of
UUNAA with regard to the ownership and transfer of real property
108
RUUNAA
and the optional filing of a statement of authority.
does not include a provision like that in UUNAA providing for
disposition of personal property of a nonprofit association that has
109
become inactive.

cmt. 2.
104. Id. § 3(c).
105. While subsection (b) of section 3 refers to “a statute,” subsection (c)
refers to “the law of this state.” Id. § 3(b)–(c). Literally, subsection (c) might be
read to allow inconsistent common-law principles to prevail over provisions of
RUUNAA, but such a result would run counter to the assertion in the Prefatory
Note that RUNNAA “provides better answers than the common law” in the areas
addressed by RUUNAA. Id. Prefatory Note at 142. It would also be inconsistent
with the notion that “principles of law and equity” may be “displaced” by a
provision of RUUNAA. See id. § 3(a) at 148. The comments simply refer to the
existence of statutory provisions regarding supervisory powers of a state’s attorney
general and requirements regarding registrations, notice, filings, and the like. Id.
§ 3 cmt. 3. These matters would appear to be supplementary rather than
conflicting, so they do not appear to shed light on the rationale for providing that
other law of the state applicable to nonprofit associations operating in the state
applies if a conflict exists.
106. Id. § 3 Legislative Note.
107. Id. § 4. The provision specifies that the law of the jurisdiction in which an
unincorporated nonprofit association has its “main place of activities” governs its
internal affairs. Id. § 4(b). As to matters other than internal affairs, the enacting
jurisdiction’s laws govern the operation, within that jurisdiction, of a nonprofit
unincorporated association formed or operating in the jurisdiction. Id. § 4(a).
108. See id. §§ 6–7, 31 at 150–51, 171.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 60–65.
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C. Capacity of Unincorporated Nonprofit Association to Sue and Be Sued
RUUNAA includes provisions similar to those in UUNAA
regarding the assertion of claims by and against an unincorporated
110
nonprofit association.
Unlike UUNAA, RUUNAA does not
address standing of an unincorporated nonprofit association to sue
on behalf of its members; that matter is left to other statutes and
111
procedural rules.
D. Liability in Contract, Tort, or Otherwise
As noted above, RUUNAA sets forth the general principle that
112
an unincorporated nonprofit association is a separate legal entity;
therefore, it follows that it is an entity for purposes of determining
and enforcing rights, duties, and liabilities in contract and tort as is
113
RUUNAA also implicitly
specifically provided by UUNAA.
recognizes the principle that the association itself may enter into
contracts and incur other liabilities by providing that a liability of
an unincorporated nonprofit association is solely the liability of the
114
association.
RUUNAA provides for limited liability of members and
managers in a broader and more succinct fashion than UUNAA,
eliminating the potential gap under UUNAA for liabilities that may
115
not literally be characterized as arising in contract or tort.
RUUNAA provides members and managers liability protection for

110. See REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 9 at 155
(providing that an unincorporated nonprofit association may sue and be sued in
its own name, and that a member or manager may assert a claim against the
association and vice versa); id. § 10 at 156 (providing that a judgment or order
against an unincorporated nonprofit association is not itself a judgment or order
against a member or manager); id. § 11 (providing for optional filing of
appointment of agent to receive service of process); id. § 13 at 158 (providing that
“[a]n action or proceeding against an unincorporated nonprofit association does
not abate merely because of a change in its members or managers”).
111. See id. § 9 cmt. 3 at 155.
112. Id. § 5(a) at 149.
113. See UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 6(a) (amended 1996),
6B U.L.A. 728 (2008) (“A nonprofit association is a legal entity separate from its
members for the purposes of determining and enforcing rights, duties, and
liabilities in contract and tort.”).
114. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 8(a)(1) at 153.
115. Compare id. § 8(a) with UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT §
6(b)–(d) at 728. For a discussion of whether other types of liabilities are
encompassed when the statute refers only to “contract” and “tort,” see supra note
82.
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debts, obligations, and liabilities of an unincorporated nonprofit
116
association “whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise.” Such
debts, liabilities, or obligations do not become the liabilities of a
member or manager solely because the member or manager acts in
such capacity, but RUUNAA makes clear that status as a member or
manager does not prevent a person from being liable under other
117
Thus, as is the case under UUNAA, a member or manager
law.
may be liable as a tortfeasor or party to a contract even though the
118
Furthermore, the
association is also subject to liability.
comments to RUUNAA, like those to UUNAA, suggest that veilpiercing principles may be a basis for imposing personal liability on
119
The comments state that “[t]he same
members and managers.
criteria that are applied to pierce the veil of nonprofit corporations
should be applied in [unincorporated nonprofit association] veil
120
piercing cases.”
In one respect, the provisions of RUUNAA limiting liability for
the debts and obligations of an unincorporated nonprofit
association do not expressly extend as far as those in UUNAA
inasmuch as the provisions of UUNAA refer to “a person
121
The
considered as a member by the nonprofit association.”
comments to UUNAA reflect the view that it is only a remote
possibility that a person who is not a “member” or “manager” as
defined in UUNAA would be found vicariously liable under the
122
Thus, the general pronouncement in RUUNAA
common law.
that a liability of an unincorporated nonprofit association is solely
the liability of the association is presumably sufficient to protect a
person who is referred to as a “member” by the association but does
not fall within the definitions of a “member” or “manager” under
RUUNAA (e.g., a contributor with no other role in the
association).

116.
117.
118.
119.
729.
120.
54.
121.
122.

REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 8(a) at 153.
Id.
See id. § 8 cmts. 1, 3 at 153–54.
Id. § 8 cmt. 1; UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 6 cmt. 6 at
REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 8 cmt. 1 at 153–
UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 6(b)–(e) at 728.
Id. § 6 cmt. 15 at 731.
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E. Power and Authority to Bind Unincorporated Nonprofit Association
UUNAA does not address agency issues in the nonprofit
association context other than providing that a nonprofit
association may authorize an agent to convey real property in a
statement of authority (which itself must be signed by an
123
authorized person), may appoint an agent for service of process
(in an appointment that must be signed by an authorized
124
person), and may be bound by a contract or liable for a tort
125
Who is an agent and the extent of
based upon acts of its agents.
the agent’s actual and apparent authority are issues left to the
common law of agency under UUNAA. RUUNAA, on the other
hand, includes a number of additional provisions impacting agency
issues.
RUUNAA specifies that “[a] member is not an agent of the
126
This statement
association solely by reason of being a member.”
does not appear to represent a significant departure from the
common-law approach to unincorporated nonprofit associations,
but it does make clear that courts should not be tempted to
127
analogize to the partnership context in this regard and seems a
sensible rule. RUUNAA’s general rule negating agency status
based merely on member status may be somewhat misleading if
viewed in isolation, however. As a default rule, RUUNAA provides
that all members are managers if a manager for an unincorporated
123. See id. § 5 at 722–23.
124. See id. § 10 at 738.
125. See id. § 6 at 728.
126. See REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 15, 6B U.L.A.
158–59 (Supp. 2011).
RUUNAA generally employs the defined term
“unincorporated nonprofit association” and sometimes uses the shorthand term
“association” when the longer defined term has appeared earlier in the same
sentence. Occasionally, the undefined shorthand term “association” is used in a
section of RUUNAA without an antecedent reference to an “unincorporated
nonprofit association.” See id. §§ 15, 22 at 158–59, 162–63. These provisions are
intended to apply to unincorporated nonprofit associations, and use of the
defined terms “member” or “manager” in these provisions appears to confine the
understanding of the term “association” to an unincorporated nonprofit
association. Thus, the inconsistency does not appear to create any literal problem.
127. “Each partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its
business.” UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 301(1) (amended 1997), 6 Pt. I U.L.A. 101 (2001);
see also REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 15 cmt. 1 at 159
(stating that the purpose of this section is to make clear that a person’s status as a
member does not itself make the person an agent of the unincorporated
nonprofit association, in contrast to partnership law, under which general partners
are deemed to be general agents of the partnership).
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128

nonprofit association is not selected. RUUNAA also provides as a
default rule that each manager has equal rights in the management
129
and conduct of the association’s activities, and the comments
indicate that the managers of an unincorporated nonprofit
association would generally be considered agents of the association
with apparent authority to bind the association in the ordinary
130
Thus, the ultimate default management
course of business.
structure of an unincorporated nonprofit association under
RUUNAA essentially follows the general partnership model, i.e.,
one in which all members are managers and thereby agents of the
association.
As noted above, the comments to RUUNAA posit that the
managers of an unincorporated nonprofit association would
ordinarily have apparent authority to bind the association for acts
131
in the ordinary course of business. This conclusion is presumably
based on the default provisions of RUUNAA regarding
management rights of managers, which borrow from the
partnership model of management rather than the corporate
132
“Manager” is defined in RUUNAA as “a person
board model.
that is responsible, alone or in concert with others, for the
133
This
management of an unincorporated nonprofit association.”
definition would encompass persons comprising a board of
directors in a traditional type of corporate management structure
128. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 22(3) at 162.
129. Id. § 22(4).
130. Id. § 15 cmt. 1 at 159 (“Under agency law the managers of [an
unincorporated nonprofit association] would in most cases be considered as
having apparent authority to bind the [association] for acts in the ordinary course
of the [association’s] business. Therefore a member who is also a manager would
be considered to be an agent of the [association] but this is because that person is
a manager as well as a member of the [association], and therefore the agency
authority is not ‘solely by reason of being a member.’”).
131. Id.
132. The default management rights of managers under RUUNAA are
described in a manner consistent with the rights of partners in a general
partnership and managers of a limited liability company under the uniform acts
governing those entities. Compare id. § 22(4)–(6) at 162 with UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §
401(f), (j) at 133 and REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407(c), 6B U.L.A. 484
(2008). The comments to the default management rules set forth in the Revised
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act distinguish the approach taken in these
provisions from the corporate board model and suggest that courts may view the
position of manager as clothing a person in that role with apparent authority to
take actions that reasonably appear to be within the ordinary course of business.
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407 cmt. at 486.
133. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2(3) at 144.
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under which the directors collectively act to set policy and make
management decisions but are not individually agents. In that type
of structure, the execution of board decisions is carried out by
officers and other agents who may have apparent authority by
virtue of a title or a course of dealing, but should not necessarily be
clothed with apparent authority to act on every matter in the
ordinary course of business. The members of an unincorporated
nonprofit association are free to adopt a corporate board structure
134
(or any other management structure) by agreement, but the
comments suggest that the default rules set forth in RUUNAA
preclude the association from having any assurance that its
directors, officers, or other types of “managers” do not have broad
135
Given the wide variety of unincorporated
apparent authority.
nonprofit associations and the frequent utilization of a corporate
board structure by such associations, an approach specifying
default rules for decision making but leaving agency issues to be
determined by the law of agency as applied to the particular facts
and circumstances in each case might be preferable to the
approach in RUUNAA.
As a default rule, it appears that the effect of RUUNAA’s
management provisions is to make each manager of an
unincorporated nonprofit association an agent with actual
authority to act in the ordinary course of activities of the
association so long as the manager has no reason to believe the
matter may be the subject of a disagreement requiring resolution
136
Acts outside the ordinary course
by a majority of the managers.
134. See id. § 22 cmt. 4 at 163.
135. See id. § 15 cmt. 1 at 159; see also id. § 22 cmt. 3 at 163 (noting that the
rights given to managers are consistent with both the rights of general partners in
a partnership and the managers of a limited liability company).
136. See id. § 22(4), (6) at 162–63 (providing that “each manager has equal
rights in the management and conduct of the association’s activities” and that “a
difference among managers is decided by a majority of the managers.”). The
comments to RUUNAA characterize the rights of managers of an unincorporated
nonprofit association as “consistent with the rights of general partners in a
partnership and managers of a limited liability company.” Id. The comments to
the comparable management provisions of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act state that a single manager of a multi-manager limited liability
company has the actual authority to bind the company in the ordinary course of
its activities unless the manager has reason to know that the other managers might
disagree or that consultation for some other reason is appropriate. REVISED UNIF.
LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407 cmt., 6B U.LA. 486 (2008). The basis for this conclusion
is that these provisions do not require managers to act in concert or after
consultation; rather they indicate “that several (as well as joint) activity is
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of business of an unincorporated nonprofit association may be
undertaken with the approval of a majority of the members as a
137
Because these rules may be varied by the
default rule.
association’s governing agreements, and the governing agreements
may be oral or established by a course of conduct as well as in a
138
record, the principal focus in determining questions of actual
authority will be on the governing agreements.
F.

Internal Governance of Unincorporated Nonprofit Associations

The comments to UUNAA explain that “troublesome
questions of governance and membership” were left to common
139
law or statutes on the subject because efforts to develop default
internal governance rules “demonstrated the complexity and
difficulty of fashioning rules that would reasonably fit a wide variety
of nonprofit associations—large and small, public benefit, mutual
140
benefit, and religious, and of short and indefinite duration.”
Although RUUNAA also applies to this wide variety of nonprofit
associations, the drafters of RUUNAA obviously concluded that it
was possible to devise appropriate rules addressing various
governance and membership issues with respect to these varied
organizations. Unincorporated nonprofit associations that are
large, well-established, or formally structured will likely have
addressed many of these issues in governing documents or by
established practices. Most of the rules addressing membership
and governance issues are default rules, that is, rules that only
apply if the governing agreements of the unincorporated nonprofit

appropriate on ordinary matters, so long as the manager acting in the matter has
no reason to believe that the matter will be controversial among the managers and
therefore requires a decision under” the provision specifying that a difference
arising among the managers regarding a matter in the ordinary course of business
may be decided by a majority of the managers. Id. Although the management
provisions in section 22 of RUUNAA do not contain any indication that meetings
are required for managers to make decisions as a default rule, RUUNAA elsewhere
states that “[n]otice and quorum requirements for meetings of managers and the
conduct of meetings of managers are determined by the governing principles.”
REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 24 at 164.
137. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT §§ 16(a), 17 at 159–
60.
138. See infra notes 152–55 and accompanying text.
139. UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT Prefatory Note (amended
1996), 6B U.L.A. 711 (2008).
140. Id. § 2 cmt. 3 at 719.
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141

association do not otherwise provide.
Thus, the statutory rules
will apply only as gap-fillers or when an unincorporated nonprofit
association’s governing agreements are inconsistent with a rule
under RUUNAA that cannot be varied by the governing
agreements.
1. Key Terms in Understanding RUUNAA Governance Rules:
“Member,” “Manager,” “Governing Principles,” and “Established
Practices”
Understanding the governance rules set forth in RUUNAA
requires an understanding of the meaning of several key terms
used in the provisions. Most of the statutory governance rules are
default rules that apply in the absence of contrary provisions in the
“governing principles,” which are the express or implied
agreements governing the purpose or operation of an
unincorporated nonprofit association and the rights and
obligations of its members and managers, as further discussed
142
RUUNAA refers to the roles of “members” and
below.
“managers” in an unincorporated nonprofit association, and these
roles are defined in functional terms.
An unincorporated
nonprofit association need not have any participants labeled by the
association as “members” or “managers,” and the labels used by an
unincorporated nonprofit association do not control for purposes
143
of applying the statute.
A “manager” is “a person that is responsible, alone or in
concert with others, for the management of an unincorporated
144
nonprofit association,” and a “member” is “a person that, under
the governing principles, may participate in the selection of
persons authorized to manage the affairs of the unincorporated
nonprofit association or in the development of the policies and
145
The comments to RUUNAA state
activities of the association.”
141. RUUNAA uses the term “governing principles” to refer to the express or
implied agreements “that govern the purpose or operation of an unincorporated
nonprofit association and the rights and obligations of its members and
managers.” REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2(2) at 144.
The “governing principles” are further discussed infra Part IV.F.1.
142. See infra text accompanying notes 152–54.
143. See REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2 cmts. 3–4 at
145.
144. Id. § 2(3) at 144. Because a “person” is defined to include entities as well
as individuals, a manager need not be an individual. See id. § 2(5).
145. Id. § 2(4).
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that the definition of “member” may have a somewhat broader
scope than the definition used by some courts and that the
definition ensures the statutory insulation from liability extends to
146
all cases in which the common law might have imposed liability.
A donor or supporter is not a “member” within the meaning of
RUUNAA (even if the association refers to the person as a
member) if the person does not have the right to participate in the
selection of managers or the development of policies and activities
147
On the other hand, the definition of a
of the association.
“member” encompasses persons who are not denominated
“members” by the association but are entitled to participate in
selecting the persons authorized to manage the association’s affairs
or in developing the association’s policies and activities; therefore,
the executive director, officers, and members of the governing
body of many associations will fall within the definition of a
148
“member” as well as a “manager.” Interestingly, the definition of
a “member” hinges on whether the governing principles permit a
person to participate in the selection of management or in the
149
development of policy, and the default provisions of the statute
confer on “members” the right to select a manager and determine
the policy of the association unless otherwise provided by the
150
governing principles. If the governing principles address neither
point, there is some circularity in the statute that may present
difficulty in satisfying the literal definition of a “member.” This
146. Id. § 2 cmt. 4 at 145.
147. See id. § 2(4) at 144.
148. See id. § 2 cmt. 4. Note that to constitute a “member” under RUUNAA,
one need only be entitled to participate in the selection of those authorized to
manage the affairs of the association or be entitled to participate in the
development of the association’s policies and activities. Both rights are not
required to be classified as a member. Id. § 2(4) at 144. Because participating in
the development of policies and activities is typically viewed in other contexts as a
management function (see infra note 163), the right to do so arguably casts the
member as a “manager” as well. On the other hand, that the statute defines a
member in terms of having a role in policy making and requires approval of policy
by members as a default matter suggests that a role in policy making is not alone
enough to constitute one a “manager” under RUUNAA. The issue is more than
merely semantics inasmuch as a member does not, “solely” by being a member,
have any fiduciary duties to an unincorporated nonprofit association as a default
rule, while a manager has fiduciary duties of loyalty and care that are not subject
to change in the governing agreements.
149. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2(4) at 144.
150. Id. § 16(a)(2), (7) at 159. In addition to the rights mentioned, members
have additional rights enumerated in the default provisions. See id. § 16(a)(1)–
(7).
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difficulty is somewhat unlikely to arise inasmuch as the governing
principles include agreements established by a course of
151
conduct, thus minimizing the likelihood that there is not some
discernible agreement as to what persons are vested with these
rights. In the final analysis, it appears that the definitions of
“member” and “manager” will result in some overlap in most
unincorporated nonprofit associations.
Another key defined term for purposes of RUUNAA’s
governance provisions is “governing principles.” The “governing
principles” are “the agreements, whether oral, in a record, or
implied from its established practices, that govern the purpose or
operation of an unincorporated nonprofit association and the
rights and obligations of its members and managers,” including
“any amendment or restatement of the agreements constituting the
152
Thus, the governing principles may be
governing principles.”
153
formally or informally established as in the case of a partnership.
The governing principles may include provisions arising from
a course of conduct referred to in RUUNAA as “established
154
The “established practices” of an unincorporated
practices.”
nonprofit association are defined as practices used by the
association “without material change during the most recent five
years of its existence, or if it has existed for less than five years,
155
The principle that a pattern of
during its entire existence.”
conduct followed over a period of time should be considered in
determining what rules have been adopted to govern a nonprofit
association’s affairs is obviously sound; whether the principle
should be rigidly defined based on usage for a period of five years
or a lesser period dating from the inception of the association’s
151. See the discussion of “established practices” in text accompanying infra
notes 154–58.
152. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2(2) at 144. The
definition actually does not state whose agreements constitute the governing
principles, but the statute specifies that the members must approve the adoption,
amendment, or repeal of the governing principles unless otherwise provided by
the governing principles. Id. § 16(a)(3) at 159. This is one of several areas in
which there is some potential circularity in the statutory provisions.
153. See id. § 2 cmt. 2 at 145 (“The ‘governing principles’ of [an
unincorporated nonprofit association] do not have to be in a written form.”).
Under the Uniform Partnership Act, a “partnership agreement” is “the agreement,
whether written, oral, or implied, among the partners concerning the partnership,
including amendments to the partnership agreement.” UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(7)
(amended 1997), 6 Pt. I U.L.A. 61 (2001).
154. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2(2) at 144.
155. Id. § 2(1).
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existence might be debated. It could be persuasively argued that
the concept should be more flexible as it is in the case of
determining whether an unincorporated nonprofit association has
been formed, i.e., whether there is “an agreement that is oral, in a
record, or implied from conduct” to join together for a common,
156
It is somewhat of a curiosity that the statute
nonprofit purpose.
does not attempt to specify the time period over which a course of
conduct is sufficient to imply an agreement to form an
157
unincorporated nonprofit association, but a course of conduct
begun at a point subsequent to the formation of the association,
i.e., which has not been followed for the association’s “entire
existence,” will not become part of its governing agreements until
158
A practice
the practice has been followed for five years.
consistently followed on a frequent, repetitive basis, e.g., in
connection with weekly or monthly meetings, arguably should be
respected as part of the governing principles of an unincorporated
nonprofit association even though the practice does not date all
the way back to the association’s inception and does not yet span a
period of five years. On the other hand, a practice followed on one
or two occasions over a period of five years or since the
association’s inception may not merit recognition as part of the
governing principles in every case.
2. Allocation of Governance Powers Between Members and
Managers
As a default rule, RUUNNA specifies certain matters that
require approval of the members and leaves all other matters to the
159
If the governing principles specify that approval of
managers.
the members is required for an unincorporated nonprofit
association to take a particular action, then approval of the
156. Id. § 2(8) at 145.
157. Id. For example, monthly meetings of a group of individuals to engage in
a social or recreational activity could presumably indicate an agreement to join
together for a common nonprofit purpose in less than five years. The comments
to RUUNAA note that “implied from conduct” is used in the definition of an
“unincorporated nonprofit association” rather than “implied from its established
practices” because the “agreement to form [an unincorporated nonprofit
association] precedes or is contemporaneous with its existence, and established
practices can only exist after the [association] is in existence.” Id. § 2 cmt. 8 at
146.
158. Id. § 2(1)–(2) at 144.
159. See id. §§ 16, 22(5) at 159, 162.
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members is required for the unincorporated nonprofit association
160
to take that action. In addition, unless otherwise provided by the
governing principles, the following matters require approval of the
members: (1) admission, suspension, dismissal, or expulsion of a
member; (2) selection or dismissal of a manager; (3) adoption,
amendment, or repeal of the governing principles; (4) sale, lease,
exchange, or other disposition of all or substantially all of the
association’s property, with or without the association’s goodwill,
outside the ordinary course of business; (5) dissolution or merger;
(6) any other act outside the ordinary course of the association’s
activities; and (7) determination of the policy and purposes of the
161
Each member is entitled to one vote, and the
association.
affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast by the members at a
meeting of the members constitutes member approval as a default
162
rule.
The scope of the requirement that members determine the
“policy” of the association is unclear. Depending upon the
meaning ascribed to “policy,” setting policy is generally viewed as a
163
management function, and the segregation of this function from
the management responsibilities vested in managers under
RUUNAA is not the subject of any explanation in the comments to
164
In essence, the effect of vesting policy-making
the statute.
authority in the members as a default rule may be that the
members constitute a type of governing board while the managers
essentially function as officers.
Matters not reserved for approval by the members are decided
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. § 16(b) at 159.
Id. § 16(a)(1)–(7).
Id. § 17(a) at 160.
2 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 9.1 (3d ed. 2010) (“According to accepted wisdom, the board of
directors appoints the chief executive officer and other corporate officers,
determines corporate policies, oversees the officers’ work, and in general manages
the corporation or supervises the management of its affairs.”).
164. In the course of a discussion of the definition of a “member,” which rests
in part upon whether a member has the right under the governing principles to
participate in the development of the “policies and activities of the association,”
the comment to section 2 of RUUNAA refers to the policies as “governing
policies.” REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2 cmt. 4 at 145–
46. The comment also distinguishes “participat[ion] . . . in the development of
policies and activities” (which is the language used to determine if one is a
member) from “determin[ation] [of the] policies and activities.” Id. Note that
the language used in section 16 requires member approval to “determine the
policy and purposes” of the association. Id. § 16 at 159.
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165

by the managers.
Unless otherwise provided by the governing
principles, only the members may select managers (who may be
members or nonmembers), and all members are managers if the
166
As a default rule, each
members do not select a manager.
manager has equal rights in the management and conduct of the
association’s activities, and a difference among managers is decided
167
As noted above, the apparent
by a majority of the managers.
effect of these management provisions is to make each manager of
an unincorporated nonprofit association an agent with actual
authority to act in the ordinary course of activities of the
association so long as the manager has no reason to believe the
matter may be the subject of a disagreement requiring resolution
168
These statutory default rules are
by a majority of the managers.
169
modeled after the rules for general partners rather than rules in
the corporate context under which officers are agents of the
corporation who carry out decisions of, or exercise decision-making
authority delegated by, a board consisting of directors who
collectively make decisions but are not individually agents of the
170
corporation.
3. Mechanics of Member and Manager Action: Meetings, Voting,
Notice, etc.
RUUNAA provides very skeletal rules regarding the mechanics
of decision making by members and managers. Unless the
governing principles provide otherwise, each member has one vote,
and the affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast at a meeting
171
The
of the members constitutes approval of the members.
165. Id. § 22(5) at 162.
166. Id. § 22(1)–(3) at 162–63. The comment to section 22 states that in
unincorporated nonprofit associations with many members, such as a church, the
default rule that all members are managers will rarely be applicable because the
governing principles will usually provide a selection process for managers. Id. § 22
cmt. 2 at 163. Read literally, however, RUUNAA would make all members
managers despite governing principles that provide for a selection process if for
some reason managers were not selected, e.g., due to a deadlock, and the
governing principles did not specify the effect of a failure to select a manager.
167. Id. § 22(4), (6) at 162–63.
168. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
169. See REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 22 cmt. 3 at
163.
170. See REINIER H. KRAAKMAN ET. AL, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 12–15 (2d ed. 2004).
171. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 17(a) at 160.
There are no default provisions specifying alternative means, such as written
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statute as approved by NCCUSL in 2008 contains no default notice
and quorum provisions; such requirements are determined by the
172
In an informal unincorporated nonprofit
governing principles.
association in which these requirements are not set forth in written
bylaws or other governing documents and the members do not by
oral agreement explicitly adopt any rules covering such matters, it
may be difficult to determine from the course of conduct what the
“established practices” that constitute the governing principles
173
In 2011, NCCUSL approved a Harmonized Uniform
require.
Business Organization Code, which included revisions of various
uniform acts to facilitate their integration into a single uniform
174
For purposes of the Harmonized Uniform
code of entity laws.
Business Organization Code, RUUNAA was amended to provide a
new default rule under which “customary usages and principles of
parliamentary law and procedure apply” to: the calling, location,
and timing of member meetings; notice and quorum requirements
of member meetings; conduct of member meetings; taking of
action by members by consent without a meeting or casting ballots;
and member participation in meetings by telephone or other
175
means of electronic communication.
As previously discussed, as a default matter, RUUNAA appears
to have adopted a partnership model of management for the
consents, for members to take action. These alternatives would need to be
provided by the governing principles to be available.
172. Id. § 17(b).
173. For example, in a small, informal unincorporated nonprofit association in
which all members attend the first several meetings but no explicit rules regarding
a quorum are adopted, is the attendance of all members required for a quorum?
The attendance of all members is consistent with any quorum requirement. The
comment to section 17 seems to indicate that meeting procedures adopted at an
initial meeting do not become part of the governing principles until followed for a
period of time so as to become an established practice, but this comment is
somewhat misleading. Id. § 17 cmt. 4 (stating that a newly formed unincorporated
nonprofit association can create meeting procedures at its initial meeting and that
“these requirements, even if oral, become over time the [unincorporated
nonprofit association’s] established practices and, therefore, part of the
[unincorporated nonprofit association’s] governing principles”). Adoption of
oral or written meeting procedures should constitute part of the governing
principles upon their adoption because the possibility of establishing governing
principles over time by established practices is an alternative, not an additional
requirement, to agreements made orally or in a record. See id. § 2(2) at 144.
174. Uniform Harmonized Business Code Approved, UNIF. L. COMM’N (July 12,
2011), http://www.nccusl.org/NewsDetail.aspx?title=Uniform%20Harmonized
%20Business%20Code%20Approved.
175. HARMONIZED UNIF. BUS. ORG. CODE § 17(c) (2011), http://www.law
.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/hobe/2011am_approved.pdf.
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managers of an unincorporated nonprofit association.
In the
event of a disagreement among the managers, the will of a majority
177
If a difference requiring resolution by
of the managers prevails.
a majority of the managers arises, any means by which the approval
or agreement of a majority of the managers can be established
would arguably satisfy the statute. Though RUUNAA does not
contain a default rule expressly specifying that a meeting of the
managers is required for the managers to make a decision, the
statute contemplates the possibility of meetings of managers
inasmuch as it specifies that requirements regarding notice,
quorum, and the conduct of meetings of managers are determined
178
by the governing principles. In 2011, RUUNAA was amended for
purposes of the Harmonized Uniform Business Organization
179
Code to provide a new default rule under which “customary
usages and principles of parliamentary law and procedure apply”
to: the calling, location, and timing of manager meetings; notice
and quorum requirements of manager meetings; conduct of
manager meetings; taking of action by managers by consent
without a meeting or casting ballots; and manager participation in
meetings by telephone or other means of electronic
180
communication.
4.

Membership Matters

Unless the governing principles of an unincorporated
nonprofit association otherwise provide, RUUNAA requires the
approval of the members for the admission, suspension, dismissal,

176. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
177. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 22(6) at 163.
178. Id. § 24 at 164. Although the statute appears to defer completely to the
governing principles with respect to rules for the conduct of meetings of
managers, the comment indicates directors or other types of managers of an
unincorporated nonprofit association could not validly give another person a
proxy to vote on a matter. Id. § 24 cmt. 2 at 165. After stating that the use of
manager proxies will be determined by law other than RUUNAA, the comment
offers a rather confusing observation involving duties and responsibilities of
managers, stating that directors or other types of managers of an unincorporated
nonprofit association may generally delegate one or more duties to another
person consistent with the governing principles but are not authorized to give
another person a proxy to vote on a matter. Id.
179. See Uniform Harmonized Business Code Approved, supra note 174.
180. HARMONIZED UNIF. BUS. ORG. CODE § 24(b) (2011), http://
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/hobe/2011am_approved.pdf.
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181

or expulsion of a member.
An unincorporated nonprofit
association may not admit a person as a member without that
182
RUUNAA provides that “[a] member may
person’s consent.
183
resign as a member in accordance with the governing principles.”
Although this provision of RUUNAA might be understood to allow
the governing principles to prevent a member from voluntarily
withdrawing, the comment states that a provision in the governing
principles precluding withdrawal would be “unconstitutional and
184
The comment further states,
void on public policy grounds.”
however, that an unincorporated nonprofit association should be
able to impose reasonable restrictions on withdrawal, such as notice
185
A member may resign at any time in the
thirty days in advance.
186
absence of applicable governing principles. As a default rule, the
suspension, dismissal, expulsion, or resignation of a member does
not relieve the member from any previously incurred obligation or
commitment, such as an unpaid capital contribution, dues,
187
A member is not permitted to transfer the
assessments, or fees.
member’s interest or any right under the governing principles as a
188
default rule.
5.

Duties of Members and Managers; Exculpation; Indemnification

Under RUUNAA, a member owes to the unincorporated
nonprofit association and the other members an obligation of good
faith and fair dealing, but does not owe “a fiduciary duty to the
unincorporated nonprofit association or another member solely by
189
In contrast, a manager owes to the
reason of being a member.”
association and its members the fiduciary duties of loyalty and
190
RUUNAA does not provide for variation in the governing
care.
181. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT §§ 16(1), 19(a) at
159, 161. The vote of the members required for these matters as a default rule is a
majority of the votes cast at a meeting of the members. Id. § 17(a) at 160.
182. Id. § 19(a) at 161. This rule is not qualified by the proviso that the
governing principles may otherwise provide, and that result seems sensible.
183. Id. § 20(a) at 162.
184. Id. § 20 cmt.
185. Id.
186. Id. § 20(a).
187. Id. §§ 19(b), 20(b) at 161–62.
188. Id. § 21 at 162.
189. Id. § 18(a) at 160.
190. Id. § 23(a) at 163. Though a member does not owe fiduciary duties to the
association or other members solely by virtue of being a member, a member who is
also a manager is subject to the fiduciary duties of a manager. See id. § 18 cmt. 1 at

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss2/3

34

Miller: Doctoring the Law of Nonprofit Associations with a Band-aid or a

886

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:2
191

principles of the fiduciary duties owed by a manager or the
192
obligation of good faith and fair dealing owed by a member,
although the statute permits the governing principles to exculpate
193
managers from liability within certain parameters and to provide
194
for broad rights of indemnification.
Though a member does not owe the unincorporated
nonprofit association or the other members any fiduciary duty by
virtue of member status, a member is required to “discharge the
duties to the unincorporated nonprofit association and the other
members and exercise any rights under [RUUNAA] consistent with
the governing principles and the obligation of good faith and fair
195
This obligation is not a fiduciary duty but rather a
dealing.”
contract principle the drafters of RUUNAA found appropriate
based on the consensual or contractual nature of an
196
Reference to “the” duties
unincorporated nonprofit association.
rather than “any” duties of a member in describing a member’s
obligation of good faith and fair dealing raises the question of what
duties a member owes the association and the other members since
197
Unlike
the statute does not itself expressly impose any duties.
other uniform unincorporated entity statutes, which provide some
freedom to vary the obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the
governing agreements, RUUNAA does not allow for any alteration
198
Possible indemnification rights
or variation of the obligation.
under the governing principles for liabilities arising from a breach

161.
191. See id. § 23(a)–(d) at 163.
192. See id. § 18(b) at 161.
193. Id. § 23(e) at 163–64.
194. Id. § 27(b) at 166.
195. Id. § 18(b) at 161.
196. See id. § 18 cmt. 2. RUUNAA bases the definitions of “unincorporated
nonprofit association” and “governing principles” on the concept of an
“agreement” rather than a “contract.” The comments explain that “agreement,”
rather than “contract,” is the appropriate term to use in the definitions “because
the legal requirements for an agreement are less stringent and less formal than for
a contract.” Id. § 2 cmt. 8 at 146. As an example, the comments point out that
both an agreement and a contract rest on mutual consent, but an agreement need
not be supported by consideration. Id.
197. See id. § 18(b) at 161 (referring to a member’s obligation to “discharge
the duties” and “exercise any rights” consistent with the obligation of good faith
and fair dealing).
198. Id. § 18 cmt. 2 (pointing out the difference between RUUNAA and the
Uniform Partnership Act and Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act in
this respect).
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199

of this obligation are discussed below.
A manager owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the
200
unincorporated nonprofit association and its members.
RUUNAA does not define the duty of loyalty, but the duty
presumably includes a duty on the part of the manager to refrain
from conflict of interest transactions, usurpation of association
201
opportunities, and competition with the association’s activities.
RUUNAA provides that a specific act or transaction that would
otherwise violate a manager’s duty of loyalty may be authorized or
ratified, after full disclosure of all material facts, by a majority of the
members that are not directly or indirectly interested in the act or
202
This procedure would prove virtually useless in the
transaction.
case of an unincorporated nonprofit association with a large
203
It is not clear why the statute does not
number of members.
provide alternatively for authorization or ratification by a majority
of disinterested managers, or at least permit the governing
204
principles to so provide. It is hard to imagine that a court would
not as a matter of common law provide a nonprofit association the
latitude to specify in its bylaws or articles of association a procedure
similar to that allowed in the nonprofit corporation context, and
perhaps a court would view the provision in RUUNAA as
nonexclusive. RUUNAA does not permit the governing principles
of an unincorporated nonprofit association to exculpate a manager
205
for a breach of the duty of loyalty, so the issue is a matter of no
small consequence.
A manager owes a fiduciary duty of care to the unincorporated
nonprofit association and its members, and RUUNAA describes the
requisite standard of care as well as a business judgment rule
199. See infra notes 214–18 and accompanying text.
200. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 23(a) at 163.
201. See id. § 23 cmt. 4 at 164 (indicating that these activities are potential
breaches of the duty of loyalty).
202. Id. § 23(c) at 163.
203. Note that section 23(c) of RUUNAA apparently requires that the
authorization or ratification be made by a majority of all disinterested members
rather than a majority of the votes cast by disinterested members at a meeting. Id.
204. Cf. id. § 27(c) at 166 (providing that a majority of disinterested managers
may authorize advance payment of expenses of a person who is made or
threatened to be made a party in an action based on the person’s activities on
behalf of the association); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.60 (2008) (providing
procedures for approval of interested director transactions including approval by a
majority of disinterested directors).
205. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 23(e)(4) at 163–
64.
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protecting a manager who makes a good faith business judgment
206
RUUNAA requires a manager to
under specified conditions.
“manage the unincorporated nonprofit association in good faith, in
a manner the manager reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the association, and with such care, including
reasonable inquiry, as a prudent person would reasonably exercise
207
The
in a similar position and under similar circumstances.”
statute permits a manager to rely in good faith on information
provided by another person that the manager reasonably believes
208
A goodto be a competent and reliable source of information.
faith business judgment by the manager satisfies the manager’s
fiduciary duty of care if the manager is disinterested and
independent with respect to the subject matter of the business
judgment, is reasonably informed, and believes that the business
judgment is in the best interests of the association and consistent
209
with its purposes.
Subject to certain exceptions, RUUNAA permits the written
governing principles to limit or eliminate a manager’s liability for
damages to the unincorporated nonprofit association or its
members with respect to an action taken as a manager or a failure
210
Liability of a manager for the
to take action as a manager.
following matters may not be limited or eliminated: (1) financial
benefit improperly received by the manager; (2) intentional
infliction of harm on the association or a member; (3) intentional
violation of criminal law; (4) breach of the duty of loyalty; and (5)
211
Thus, while RUUNAA does not specify
improper distributions.
that the governing principles may alter the duties of care and
loyalty, a manager’s liability for damages for a breach of the duty of
care could be eliminated by written governing principles so long as
206. See id. § 23(a)–(b), (d) at 163.
207. Id. § 23(b).
208. Id.
209. Id. § 23(d). This provision specifies that compliance with the provision
satisfies the duties specified in subsection (a), i.e., the duty of loyalty as well as the
duty of care, but a duty of loyalty challenge to a manager’s business decision will
generally involve a conflict of interest or lack of independence, which precludes
application of the business judgment rule. See id. § 23(d)(1).
210. Id. § 23(e) at 163–64. The provision specifies that the exculpation can be
accomplished by means of governing principles “in a record.” Id. § 23(e) at 163.
“Record” is a defined term meaning “information that is inscribed on a tangible
medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in
perceivable form.” Id. § 2(6) at 144.
211. Id. § 23(e) at 163–64.
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the breach did not involve any of the types of conduct excepted by
the statute from the purview of permissible exculpation. The
comments to RUUNAA, however, point out that a manager could
still be bound by an injunction or other equitable remedy, even if
the manager has been exempted from money damages under the
212
governing principles.
RUUNAA provides rules for indemnification of current and
former members and managers, and for advancement of expenses
213
As a default
incurred before final disposition of a proceeding.
rule, the statute requires reimbursement of authorized expenses
reasonably incurred by a member or manager on behalf of an
unincorporated nonprofit association, and permits the association
to indemnify a member or manager for any “liability incurred in
the course of the member’s or manager’s activities on behalf of the
association if the person seeking indemnification has complied
214
Section 18 imposes on a member an
with sections 18 and 23.”
obligation of good faith and fair dealing, and section 23 imposes
215
Thus, as a
on a manager the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.
default matter, the statute does not appear to permit an
unincorporated nonprofit association to indemnify a member or
manager for a liability arising from a breach of any of these duties.
However, the statute permits written governing principles to
216
Thus, although the duties
“broaden or limit indemnification.”
themselves may not be altered and the extent to which the
governing principles may provide for exculpation is limited, there
are no express limits placed on the extent to which indemnification
may be permitted or required by written governing principles. As
an example of how indemnification might be broadened, the
comments state that the governing principles could make
mandatory the indemnification permitted by the statute as a
217
Since the statute does not place any limits on the
default rule.
212. Id. § 23 cmt. 5 at 164.
213. Id. § 27 at 166–67.
214. Id. § 27(a)–(b) at 166.
215. Id. §§ 18(b), 23(a) at 161, 163. Section 23 also elaborates on these duties
to some extent by requiring a manager to manage in good faith and in accordance
with a specified standard of care, setting forth a business judgment rule, and
providing a means for approval of an act or transaction that would otherwise
violate a manager’s duty of loyalty. Id. § 23(b)–(d) at 163.
216. Id. § 27(b) at 166 (specifying that the limitation or broadening of
indemnification can be accomplished by means of governing principles “in a
record”).
217. Id. § 27 cmt. 2 at 167.
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extent to which written governing principles may “broaden”
indemnification, the statute may be understood to permit the
governing principles to permit, or even mandate, indemnification
for liabilities arising from any breach of duty, even those that
cannot be exculpated. If interpreted in this manner, the RUUNAA
indemnification provision is considerably more lax than the
indemnification provisions in the business entity statutes that are
218
characterized as being similar to RUUNAA in the comments.
RUUNAA specifies a procedure pursuant to which an
unincorporated nonprofit association may advance or reimburse
expenses to a person who is made, or threatened to be made, a
party in an action based on the person’s activities on behalf of the
219
Written governing principles may broaden or limit
association.
the advance payments or reimbursements authorized in the
220
As in the case of the discretionary indemnification
statute.
authorized by the statute, there are no express constraints on the
ability to broaden the right to advancement of expenses in a
221
proceeding.
RUUNAA makes clear that an unincorporated nonprofit
association may purchase insurance on behalf of a member or
manager to protect the person from liability in the person’s
capacity as a member or manager, even if the insurance covers
liability or expenses that the association would not be authorized
222
under the statute to reimburse, indemnify, or advance.

218. See id. The comments to section 27 state that the rights to reimbursement
and indemnification are similar to those found in other business entity statutes,
citing section 408 of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act and
sections 8.50–58 of the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act. Id. § 27 cmt. 1.
However, the ability to expand the indemnification provided by the cited
provisions of these statutes is expressly limited in each of these statutes in contrast
to the unlimited authorization for expansion of indemnification rights apparently
conferred under RUUNAA. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 110(g), 6B
U.L.A. 444 (2008) (limiting the ability to provide for indemnification with respect
to breach of the duty of loyalty, receipt of a financial benefit to which a member or
manager is not entitled, breach of a duty imposed with respect to limitations on
distributions, intentional infliction of harm on the company or a member, and
intentional violation of criminal law); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.58 (2008)
(limiting the scope of provisions for indemnification in articles of incorporation,
bylaws, corporate resolutions, or a contract).
219. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 27(c) at 166.
220. Id. (specifying that the limitation or broadening of advancement can be
accomplished by means of governing principles “in a record”).
221. See id. § 27(b)–(c) at 166.
222. Id. § 27(d) at 167.
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Information Rights

RUUNAA does not require an unincorporated nonprofit
association to keep any particular records, but the statute requires
any records that are kept regarding the association’s “activities,
financial condition, and other circumstances” to be made available
to a member or manager for inspection and copying “to the extent
the information is material to the member’s or manager’s rights
223
Logically, the right
and duties under the governing principles.”
should extend to information that is material to the member’s or
manager’s rights or duties under RUUNAA, even if such rights or
224
duties are not addressed in the governing principles, but the
statute stops short of literally conferring the right in those
circumstances.
RUUNAA authorizes the governing principles to impose
“reasonable restrictions on access to and use of information” that
the association is required to furnish, such as designating
information as confidential and imposing obligations of
225
The
nondisclosure and safeguarding on the recipient.
association may charge for reasonable copying costs and specify a
226
A person
reasonable location for making the records available.
making a demand for access to information must provide
reasonable notice and is entitled to access only during the
227
association’s regular operating hours.

223. Id. § 25(a) at 165. A former member or manager may obtain information
“to which the former member or manager was entitled while a member or
manager if the information pertains to the period during which the person was a
member or manager.” Id. § 25(d).
224. For instance, information that is necessary for a manager to discharge the
manager’s fiduciary duties under the statute or for a member to vote in an
informed manner on a matter requiring member approval should be available to
the manager or member even if the governing principles are silent on these issues
and the sole source of the fiduciary duty or right is thus the statute. See id. § 23(a)
at 163 (specifying that managers owe fiduciary duties of loyalty and care); id. §§
16(a), 17(a) at 159–60 (listing matters requiring member approval and specifying
voting rights of members in absence of contrary provisions in governing
principles).
225. Id. § 25(b) at 165.
226. Id. § 25(a), (c).
227. Id. § 25(a). The concept of “regular operating hours” may be difficult to
apply in the case of small organizations that have no staff or offices and whose
books and records are merely held by volunteers who are currently serving in roles
such as secretary and treasurer.
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Distributions and Other Payments

RUUNAA prohibits an unincorporated nonprofit association
from paying dividends or making distributions to a member or
manager other than as permitted by the statute in limited
228
circumstances. The statute permits an unincorporated nonprofit
association to pay reasonable compensation or reimburse
reasonable expenses to a member or manager, confer benefits on a
member or manager in accordance with the association’s nonprofit
purposes, repurchase a membership interest or repay a member’s
capital contribution to the extent authorized by the governing
principles, and make distributions to members upon winding up
229
“Distribution” is
and termination if certain conditions are met.
not a defined term in RUUNAA, and the inclusion of reasonable
compensation and reimbursement of reasonable expenses for
services rendered as an exception to the prohibition on
distributions to members or managers, while various other types of
payments that might be made to members or managers are not
listed as an exception, could create some uncertainty regarding the
types of payments that constitute distributions and thus are
prohibited. Since the statute expressly authorizes reimbursement,
indemnification, and advancement of various expenses and
230
liabilities under section 27 of RUUNAA, such payments should
not be treated as prohibited distributions, but some confusion
might arise by virtue of the fact that reimbursement of reasonable
expenses for services rendered is listed in section 26 as an
exception to the prohibition on distributions whereas other types
of reimbursement and indemnification authorized by section 27
231
Similarly, it might be argued that a
are not listed as exceptions.
purchase of property by an unincorporated nonprofit association
from a manager or member involves a payment that is not specified
as permissible in section 26 and is thus prohibited, even though the
232
terms of the sale were entirely fair and reasonable.
228. Id. § 26(a) at 166.
229. Id. § 26(b).
230. See id. § 27.
231. See id. § 26(b)(1).
232. In the case of a manager who sells property to the association, the
transaction would create a duty of loyalty concern, but the transaction would
apparently be permissible if approved by a majority of disinterested members after
full disclosure of all material facts. See id. § 23(c) at 163. A member does not owe
a fiduciary duty to the association solely by reason of being a member. Id. § 18 at
160.
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Although RUUNAA does not address liability associated with
an impermissible distribution, the comments state that an action to
recover an improper distribution could be brought by the
unincorporated nonprofit association or by a member as a
233
The comments
derivative action if authorized by state law.
further note that the Attorney General may have authority under
234
The comments also
state law to bring a disgorgement action.
state, however, that a distribution to members in violation of the
statute would “disqualify” an unincorporated nonprofit association
235
from continuing to be an unincorporated nonprofit association.
These comments reflect something of a conflict in philosophy
regarding the effect of a prohibited distribution. If a prohibited
distribution causes an unincorporated nonprofit association to
cease to be such, the association and its members can no longer
rely on its entity status under RUUNAA to assert the claim.
Certainly, a pervasive pattern of prohibited distributions or even a
single prohibited distribution in a significant amount might
indicate that the members are no longer joined for a nonprofit
purpose; however, it does not appear that each and any instance of
a prohibited distribution should cause the unincorporated
nonprofit association to cease to be such. It may well be that the
members are still joined under an agreement to operate for a
common nonprofit purpose and desire to continue as an
unincorporated nonprofit association while holding accountable
those who authorized or received the prohibited distribution.
Despite the comments to the statute, it is not clear that the statute
requires the conclusion that payment of any prohibited
distribution disqualifies an unincorporated nonprofit association
from continuing as an unincorporated nonprofit association.
G. Dissolution, Winding Up, and Termination
RUUNAA lists circumstances under which an unincorporated
nonprofit association may be dissolved and provides a skeletal set of
236
rules for the winding up and termination upon dissolution.
Under RUUNAA, an unincorporated nonprofit association is
dissolved at the time or by the method provided by the governing
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. § 26 cmt. 3 at 166.
Id.
Id. § 26 cmt. 1; id. § 5 cmt. 4 at 150.
Id. §§ 28–29 at 167–68.
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237

principles or upon approval by the members. If no member can
be located and the association has been inactive for three years, the
association may be dissolved by the managers or, if the association
238
The statute also
has no current manager, by its last manager.
provides that an unincorporated nonprofit association may be
239
dissolved by court order or under law other than RUUNAA. The
statute does not specify grounds for judicial dissolution, but the
comments state that a court order of dissolution would be
appropriate if it is impossible or impracticable to continue or if the
other grounds for dissolution in the statute (i.e., a time or method
specified by the governing principles, member approval, or
240
manager action in an inactive association) are inapplicable.
A dissolved unincorporated nonprofit association continues to
exist until its activities have been wound up and the association is
241
RUUNAA does not define a
terminated pursuant to RUUNAA.
point in time when the association is terminated, but simply
requires that all known debts and liabilities be paid or adequately
provided for and specifies how remaining property should be
distributed. Presumably, the association is terminated when these
steps are completed. The statute does not provide any other
winding up rules or procedures that are often found in entity
statutes, such as procedures addressing notice to known and
242
unknown claimants.
H. Merger
RUUNAA has merger provisions under which an
unincorporated nonprofit association may merge with another
unincorporated nonprofit association or any other organization
whose governing law authorizes a merger with an unincorporated
243
nonprofit association. A jurisdiction considering the adoption of
RUUNAA should carefully examine the merger provisions to
ensure consistency with other merger statutes in the jurisdiction
and to consider unique concerns that may be encountered in the
237. Id. § 28(a)(1)–(2) at 167.
238. Id. § 28(a)(3) at 168.
239. Id. § 28(a)(4)–(5).
240. Id. § 28 cmt. 2.
241. Id. § 28(b).
242. See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 14.06–14.08 (2008); REVISED UNIF.
LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 703–04, 6B U.L.A. 508–10 (2008).
243. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 30(b) at 169–70.
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context of a merger involving an unincorporated nonprofit
association. The inclusion of inter-entity merger provisions in
RUUNAA might lead one to expect that there would also be
conversion provisions, but RUUNAA does not contain any
conversion provisions.
Though the merger provisions in RUUNAA reflect an attempt
to address concerns peculiar to the nonprofit context, the
application of these provisions may be unclear in some cases. For
instance, the statute states that the “plan of merger may not permit
members of an unincorporated nonprofit association to receive
merger consideration if a distribution of such consideration” would
not otherwise be permissible under the provisions specifying
exceptions to the prohibition of distributions to members,
including the exception that permits distributions of remaining
property in the winding up of an unincorporated nonprofit
244
association. This provision suggests that a merger may be treated
as a winding up and termination of an unincorporated nonprofit
association for purposes of distributing merger consideration to the
members. The rationale appears to be that a merger of an
unincorporated nonprofit association (which is not technically a
winding up and termination, but rather is a continuation of all the
property, rights, and obligations of the constituent organizations in
the surviving organization) is equivalent to a winding up and
termination of the association for purposes of distributing merger
245
consideration, at least in some cases. It is not entirely clear if the
effect of the provision is to permit a distribution to a member
under the winding up provisions in any merger of an
unincorporated nonprofit association or whether the provision
requires an analysis of the merger to determine if it is analogous to
a winding up and termination of the association. For example, an
argument could be made that the analogy is appropriate if the
244. Id. § 30(c)(2)(E) at 169.
245. The statute states that “the plan of merger may not permit members of an
unincorporated nonprofit association to receive merger consideration if a
distribution of such consideration would not be permitted in the absence of a
merger under Sections 26 and 29.” Id. Section 26 prohibits distributions to
members with four exceptions, one of which is “distributions of property to
members upon winding up and termination to the extent permitted by Section
29.” Id. § 26(b)(4) at 166. Section 29 specifically deals with the disposition or
distribution of property in winding up and termination, including permitting
distributions to members in some circumstances. Id. § 29(4)(B) at 169−70. There
would be no purpose in referencing section 29 in section 30(c)(2)(E) unless
section 29(4)(B) had some potential application in a merger context.
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nonprofit association is not the surviving entity and the merger
transaction is effectively accomplishing an acquisition of the
association’s assets by the surviving entity, but not if the
unincorporated nonprofit association is the surviving organization.
Even this type of approach to the provision might permit an
unincorporated nonprofit association that is the surviving entity in
a merger to distribute merger consideration to its members in
some cases. The analogy to a winding up and termination in that
scenario appears less apt. However, if the overall result in a
particular merger is that the identity of an unincorporated
nonprofit association that technically survived the merger has in
substance been overtaken by the identity of a constituent entity that
technically did not survive the merger, it might be argued that the
surviving nonprofit association has effectively terminated and
should be permitted to distribute the merger consideration to its
members.
The RUUNAA merger provisions contain a provision similar to
a provision in the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act that prohibits
“property held for a charitable purpose under the law of the state”
from being “diverted from the objects for which [the property] was
given” as a result of a merger absent an appropriate order by a
246
court or the Attorney General for the disposition of the property.
Another provision of RUUNAA that is quite similar to a provision
of the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act makes clear that the
surviving organization succeeds to a bequest, devise, gift, grant, or
promise to a nonsurviving organization that takes effect after the
merger, and property that is transferred to the surviving
organization by virtue of such a devise, gift, grant, or promise is
subject to a trust obligation that would govern the property if
247
Some other
transferred to the nonsurviving organization.
restrictions included in the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act
248
merger provisions are not included in the RUUNAA provisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law governing unincorporated nonprofit associations in
many jurisdictions consists of common-law principles (some of
246. See id. § 30(e) at 170; MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 11.01(b).
247. See REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 30(f) at 170;
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 11.02(e).
248. See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 11.01(c)−(d).
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which are problematic or difficult to ascertain due to the absence
of well-developed case law in the jurisdiction) and perhaps a
249
NCCUSL has made two attempts to
smattering of statutes.
improve the law with uniform statutes. UUNAA has been adopted
250
NCCUSL’s more
in twelve states and the District of Columbia.
recent product, RUUNAA, has been adopted by four jurisdictions,
including the District of Columbia and one other state that had
251
An examination of the different
previously adopted UUNAA.
approaches taken in UUNAA and RUUNAA and the manner in
which these statutes address particular issues reveals that there are
advantages and disadvantages to the overall approach in each as
well as challenges involved in articulating particular provisions.
UUNAA adopts an entity approach to unincorporated
252
Although it
nonprofit associations with respect to specific issues.
only deals with a limited number of issues, it arguably encompasses
the areas that have proved most troublesome for unincorporated
nonprofit associations and their members under the common
253
Nevertheless, UUNAA has been criticized for its skeletal
law.
254
approach.
RUUNAA takes a more comprehensive approach, conferring
entity status on unincorporated nonprofit associations and
addressing, in addition to the issues addressed by UUNAA, various
aspects of governance, basic rules regarding dissolution and
255
While the more comprehensive
winding up, and mergers.
approach of RUUNAA has the appeal of providing rules in
instances where the case law in a jurisdiction may be vague or
nonexistent, the statutory rule may constrain the court in
developing or applying the common law in a manner most suitable
to the particular situation before the court. Myriad types of
nonprofit associations are encompassed by RUUNAA; therefore,
the rules have the potential to be applied in very large to very small
associations, with innumerable potential structures and many
different types of nonprofit purposes ranging from charitable to
249. California has developed its own somewhat comprehensive
unincorporated nonprofit association statute, but it is a notable exception. See
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 18000−18640 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
250. See supra note 6.
251. See supra note 8.
252. See supra notes 32−35 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 19−30 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 87−91 and accompanying text.
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256

mutual benefit.
Absent a statutory rule applicable to an issue
before a court, the court will have to rely on and draw from
common-law agency, fiduciary, contract, or other relevant
principles. Though the existence of statutory rules may provide
more specific parameters and thus some greater certainty, the
statutory rules do so at the expense of some potential flexibility on
the part of the courts in particular cases.
As an example of a rule that provides a definite standard that
may constrain a court in a particular case in an unfortunate
manner, RUUNAA defines the “established practices,” i.e., the
course of conduct by which an implied agreement may be
established for purposes of the “governing principles” of an
unincorporated nonprofit association, as practices used without
material change during the most recent five years or during the
association’s entire existence if it has existed for less than five
257
Arguably, there will be circumstances under which a
years.
practice consistently followed on a frequent repetitive basis, e.g., in
connection with weekly or monthly meetings, should be respected
as part of the governing principles of an unincorporated nonprofit
association even though the practice does not date all the way back
to the association’s inception and does not yet span a period of five
years. On the other hand, a practice followed on one or two
occasions over a period of five years or since the association’s
inception may not merit recognition as part of the governing
principles in every case. Notably, the statute does not attempt to
specify the time period over which a course of conduct is sufficient
to imply an agreement to form an unincorporated nonprofit
258
association.
When courts speak unclearly, too broadly, or too narrowly in
the course of developing or applying common-law principles in a
particular case, they have the opportunity to clarify or reinvent the
principles when subsequent cases involving application of the
principles arise. If a statute is imprecise, too broad, or too narrow,
the courts may have less room to maneuver. Several provisions of
RUUNAA provide examples of statutory rules that could present
problems associated with an unclear, narrow, or broad articulation
of the rule, thus pointing to areas where the rules may need

256.
257.
258.

See supra note 96.
See supra notes 154−58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 157.
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259

refinement if they are to be specified by statute.
RUUNAA is
certainly, however, a very useful starting point for a jurisdiction that
wishes to adopt a more comprehensive statutory scheme for
unincorporated nonprofit associations. Indeed, a jurisdiction that
concludes it is better served by the overall approach in UUNAA
(i.e., addressing areas that have been the significant problem areas
under the common law and leaving other areas such as governance
to the common law), may find that the manner in which RUUNAA
articulates (or omits) the issues addressed in UUNAA is an
260
improvement over the articulation in UUNAA.
As courts and commentators have mused, unincorporated
associations can be enigmatic and troublesome creatures. The law
governing them is bound to be somewhat messy, and there is
doubtless no perfect approach to addressing the various
mechanical and policy issues that will arise in the context of the
myriad organizations that may exist. In the end, it is productive to
examine and debate varied models and to draw on the experience
and wisdom gained as the statutes and case law continue to
develop. A statutory band-aid like UUNAA may prove perfectly
adequate in a jurisdiction whose courts are otherwise reaching
sensible results under agency, fiduciary, and other common-law
principles as the cases arise. The body-cast approach of RUUNAA
might merely prove to prevent the courts from properly treating
areas that are constrained by an ill-fitting cast. On the other hand,
a jurisdiction might well determine that the common law of the
jurisdiction is in need of much more than a band-aid, and that a
more comprehensive and definite set of rules in the nature of those
set forth in RUUNAA best serves the jurisdiction. Undoubtedly,
there are still many lessons to be learned in this area regardless of
the status of the law in any particular jurisdiction.

259. See, e.g., supra notes 202−04, 214–18, 223−24, 229−32 and accompanying
text.
260. For example, the UUNAA provisions regarding the limited liability of
members and managing persons leave some literal gaps, although the apparent
intent is to provide corporate-type liability protection. See supra notes 81−82 and
accompanying text. RUUNAA improves upon the wording in the provisions
addressing the scope of the liability protection of members and managers. See
supra notes 115−16 and accompanying text. Also, unlike UUNAA, RUUNAA does
not include provisions on standing of an association to sue on behalf of its
members since other law may be viewed as adequately addressing that issue. See
supra notes 77−79, 111 and accompanying text.
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